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 Framework
ALYSSA R. BERNSTEIN
Philosophy Department, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, USA
ABSTRACT Obstacles to achieving a global climate treaty include disagreements about questions 
of justice raised by the UNFCCC's principle that countries should respond to climate change by 
taking cooperative action “in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions”. Aiming to circumvent such disa-
greements, Climate Change Justice (2010) authors Eric Posner and David Weisbach argue against 
shaping treaty proposals according to requirements of either distributive or corrective justice. The 
USA's climate envoy, Todd Stern, takes a similar position. In this article I explain the practical 
and theoretical drawbacks of Posner & Weisbach's welfarist (utilitarian) perspective and propose 
an alternative. I show that their arguments fail to rule out John Rawls's non-utilitarian, political 
conception of international justice and human rights, the Law of Peoples. On this basis I develop 
a conception of climate justice that highlights implications of some of Rawls's principles and adds 
a principle for determining fair shares of climate-treaty-related benefits and burdens. I propose 
this conception as a moral framework for negotiating a treaty that would promote human welfare 
consistently with requirements of justice, and I argue that a treaty proposal satisfying these require-
ments could best satisfy Posner & Weisbach's own feasibility criteria.
Among the obstacles to achieving a global climate treaty are disagreements about 
questions of corrective and distributive justice, such as those involved in discussions 
about how to interpret a particularly important idea in the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992: the principle that countries 
should respond to climate change by taking cooperative action ‘in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their 
social and economic conditions’ (abbreviated as ‘CBDR’ or as ‘differentiation’). Eric 
Posner and David Weisbach (2010), authors of Climate Change Justice, aim to remove 
those obstacles in order to avert the tragedy that could result from failure to achieve a 
global climate treaty. They argue that the negotiators should not shape treaty propos-
als to meet requirements of distributive or corrective justice, but should instead focus 
on practical matters such as comparing proposed mitigation measures with regard to 
aggregate global costs and benefits, and creating incentives sufficient to ensure that 
all countries will join the treaty.
Correspondence Address: Alyssa R. Bernstein. Ellis Hall 202, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701, USA. Email: 
bernstei@ohio.edu, bastinbernstein@gmail.com
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According to Posner and Weisbach, treaty proposals should be efficient and feasible. 
More specifically, they should satisfy two criteria: the economic requirement of global 
optimality1 and the pragmatic constraint of International Paretianism, which the authors 
define thus: ‘all states must believe themselves better off by their lights as a result of the 
climate treaty’ (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 6).2 They argue also that all countries (and in 
particular all ‘major emitting countries’) have obligations to join a climate agreement and 
not to free-ride (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, pp. 181–183). They base their conclusions on 
a type of welfarism.3
Posner and Weisbach's arguments appear to provide support for a position taken recent-
ly by the United States' Special Envoy for Climate Change, Todd Stern, on the question of 
how to interpret CBDR. Stern advocates a forward-looking climate treaty, as explained be-
low. Similarly, Posner and Weisbach oppose using principles of corrective justice, which 
are backward-looking, to design a climate treaty. Here I critically analyze their arguments 
and propose an alternative, a non-welfarist moral framework for the climate treaty nego-
tiations.
Posner and Weisbach focus their attention mainly on the difficulties of designing an 
international climate treaty. I agree with them about the need for such a treaty;4 taking this 
as given, I focus as they do on the question they think ‘may be the most difficult’: that 
of how the burdens of mitigation or abatement measures should be distributed (Posner & 
Weisbach, 2010, p. 3). States disagreeing with each other on this question have invoked 
various principles of justice. According to Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 4), the central 
arguments about justice are vulnerable to serious objections of principle; furthermore, be-
cause their proponents fail to give due consideration to pragmatic or feasibility constraints, 
they threaten to derail a climate agreement and thus to hurt the nations and people who are 
pressing those very arguments. I agree with Posner and Weisbach when they say that the 
challenge is to construct a treaty that is both feasible and ethical, promoting the welfare 
of people all over the world consistently with the requirements of justice (Posner & Weis-
bach, 2010, pp. 4–5). However, I disagree with their welfarist theoretical approach to this 
problem5 and with their conception of distributive justice.6
There are practical as well as theoretical drawbacks to Posner and Weisbach's welfarist 
approach to these issues and, more generally, to basing the climate treaty negotiations 
ultimately on welfarist, utilitarian, or other consequentialist moral principles. Since the 
negotiations are authorized by international law and are further developing it by creat-
ing new legal obligations, they should be conducted in accordance with the principles 
grounding the rights and obligations of the negotiating states, including those they have 
in the negotiation process and would have under the treaty. The negotiations should be 
based on a political conception of justice that can be the focus of an overlapping consen-
sus, the need for which has been emphasized recently by prominent philosophers criti-
cizing the position of Posner and Weisbach (Jamieson, 2013, p. 467; Nussbaum, 2013, 
p. 485).
An example of a political conception of justice is John Rawls' conception of the moral 
basis of a just international order, the Law of Peoples (presented in Rawls, 1993, 1999).7 
Its principles are formulated to apply to international law and practice, and it can be the 
focus of an overlapping consensus. As I explain below, it is a conception of distributive 
justice in the broader of the two senses of the term (‘distributive justice’) that Rawls distin-
guishes, but not in the narrower sense used by Posner and Weisbach; for this reason among 
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others, their arguments against allowing principles of distributive justice to constrain trea-
ty negotiations fail to apply to the Law of Peoples.
Below I briefly develop a political conception of climate justice based on the Law of 
Peoples, and argue that it has both theoretical and practical advantages over welfarism as a 
moral framework for the climate treaty negotiations. I use arguments informed by the writ-
ings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (on social and international cooperation for the common 
good) and Immanuel Kant (on moral agency, obligation, and cosmopolitanism).8 I use 
some of Rawls' concepts and arguments, emphasize climate-change-relevant implications 
of some of the principles of the Law of Peoples, and add a principle for determining fair 
shares of climate-treaty-related benefits and burdens.
I contend that this political conception of climate justice is appropriate to serve as a 
moral framework for the climate treaty negotiations.9 Treaty proposals should satisfy the 
requirements of its principle for determining fair shares of the costs and other burdens of 
mitigation and adaptation measures. No treaty proposal justifiable on welfarist grounds 
should be considered globally optimal unless it is consistent with this political conception 
of justice. A treaty proposal that satisfies its requirements can also satisfy Posner and 
Weisbach's treaty criteria of International Paretianism and feasibility, indeed better than 
proposals justifiable only in terms of welfarism, as I argue below.
1. Obstacles to Achieving a Global Climate Treaty
A major obstacle to achieving an agreement at the climate treaty negotiations in Lima, 
Peru (in December 2014) was what participants and commentators referred to as the ‘dif-
ferentiation’ issue (Taraska & Vogel, 2014). Two months prior to the Lima conference, the 
United States' Special Envoy, Todd Stern, referred to this issue in a speech, saying that ‘the 
most important’ obstacle concerns how to interpret CBDR, which is ‘the core principle 
asserted by developing countries’.10 The UNFCCC says that developed countries need to 
‘take immediate action’ and should ‘take the lead in combatting climate change’ while 
allowing poorer countries to develop and acknowledging that ‘their energy consumption 
will need to grow.’ Although in Lima the negotiators finally agreed upon a text, the issue 
is expected to arise again at the negotiations in Paris in December 2015 (Taraska & Vogel, 
2014).
In his speech, Stern opposed the idea that the 1992 categorization of countries should be 
included in the new agreement because climate change is the developed countries' fault: 
‘that approach isn't going to advance the ball because developed countries don't accept that 
worldview, and because descending into that kind of debate at this stage is the last way to 
find common ground.’ To insist on basing the new agreement ‘in form or content on im-
mutable 1992 categories’ would be ‘a deal-breaker,’ he declared; instead of using a ‘back-
wards-facing structure,’ it is necessary to ‘build our new agreement looking forward, to 
reflect the economic, political and environmental realities of the next decade and beyond.’ 
Stern's position appears justifiable when considered within the welfarist framework advo-
cated by Posner and Weisbach. However, as I explain next, this framework has theoretical, 
moral, and practical drawbacks, while the political conception of climate justice has cor-
responding advantages. Later I will return to the disagreement about differentiation, and 
suggest that the political conception of climate justice provides appropriate guidance for 
resolving this issue.
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2. Posner and Weisbach's Welfarist Perspective
Despite the title of their book, Climate Change Justice, Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 5) 
argue that considerations of (in)justice should not shape a climate treaty:
Many people argue that the climate treaty should reflect principles of corrective and 
distributive justice. They treat climate negotiations as an opportunity to solve some 
of the world's most serious problems—the admittedly unfair distribution of wealth 
across northern and southern countries, the lingering harms of the legacy of coloni-
alism, and so forth. We reject this approach.
They contend that a climate treaty should meet neither requirements of corrective 
justice11 nor requirements of distributive justice.12 They favor ‘a forward-looking, 
welfarist approach to the problem of climate change that satisfies pragmatic con-
straints’ and ‘takes the state system seriously by respecting International Paretian-
ism’ (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 191).
Posner and Weisbach's (2010, p. 192) central contention is that it would be ‘a cruel 
irony if the consequence of justice-related arguments were to doom the prospects for an 
international agreement—and thus to create exceedingly serious risks to human welfare, 
above all in poor nations’. They argue that if distributive justice is the goal, it is necessary 
to recognize that pursuing this goal through a climate treaty may not be the best way of 
redistributing wealth from rich countries to poor ones; but if climate harm mitigation is the 
goal, the best way to pursue it is by agreeing to a treaty that stipulates the ‘globally opti-
mal’ abatement plan (as determined by aggregation of benefits and costs across countries), 
‘even though that is not what is optimal for poor states,’ if the treaty can get ratified and 
survive pressures to cheat (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, pp. 97–98). They also think it likely 
that states believing they will be harmed relatively less by climate change will either agree 
only to limited abatement requirements, or else agree to more demanding requirements 
only on condition that they receive ‘side payments;’ and that these payments ‘may go from 
poor to rich, at least in part’ (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, pp. 84–85). Despite objections 
from perspectives of corrective and distributive justice, Posner and Weisbach would favor 
such side payments if they were necessary in order to induce the richer countries to agree 
to a treaty stipulating the globally optimal abatement plan.
3. Deontology versus Welfarism
Posner and Weisbach do not contend that their treaty criteria are requirements of justice, 
and they argue against using requirements of justice as criteria for an acceptable climate 
treaty. My own view is that a climate treaty should satisfy robust requirements of justice, 
since it will set the terms for global cooperative mitigation and adaptation efforts that will 
significantly affect our planet's entire human population, directly and indirectly, from the 
present into the indefinite future. These cooperative efforts may cause or permit destruc-
tion of nations as well as other harms to individual human beings: at stake are fundamental 
and vital interests of states as well as of the people whom they represent; these interests 
include survival and security. Therefore the parties to the negotiations (representatives of 
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states) should be able to justify their proposals, to each other as well as to the people whom 
they represent, by reference to a reasonable conception of justice that they all can endorse.
Such a conception would be the focus of an overlapping consensus.13 This means that 
a treaty proposal justified in its terms could be offered in the belief that it is not unjust, 
and with the reasonable expectation that those to whom it is offered will not find any good 
reason to reject it as unjust. The parties to the negotiations should offer each other only 
treaty proposals that are justifiable by reference to such a conception of justice, that is, by 
appeal to public reason.
The arguments offered by Posner and Weisbach to justify their criteria for a climate 
treaty are based on a welfarist ethical conception, which is a type of consequentialist 
theory. Consequentialism refers to a set of ethical theories holding that the rightness or 
wrongness of acts or policies depend on their consequences. Consequentialist theories are 
teleological; in ethics, ‘teleology’ refers to the evaluation of conduct in relation to the end 
or ends it serves, realizes, or helps to constitute. In this article I use the term ‘deontology’ 
to refer to non-teleological conceptions of morality or justice.
A moral framework for the climate treaty negotiations may be either teleological or 
deontological, depending on the character of the moral principles on which it is based. 
Consequentialist teleological theories define right conduct or policies as those that pro-
duce the outcomes that are best, or that create or increase or promote what is good; first 
they identify what is good, and from this they derive conclusions about the right thing 
to do (the best means to the end). Deontological theories are non-consequentialist in the 
sense that they start with the concepts that are fundamental to morality and justice (such 
as obligation, duty, voluntary consent, agreement, cooperation, fairness), and on this basis 
draw conclusions about what outcomes, goals, and interests people may reasonably con-
sider good and how people with different interests can cooperate on fair terms.
Posner and Weisbach do not argue for welfarism, nor do they assume that everyone 
worldwide endorses it (nor only the members of the academic community, whether world-
wide or only in the USA). As they acknowledge, proponents of other conceptions of eth-
ics, morality, and justice, whether religious or secular (which they group together under 
the term ‘deontological approaches’) reject consequentialist conceptions including wel-
farism (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 8). Furthermore, Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 173) 
say that for their purposes they need not make fine-grained distinctions between ethical 
theories. They use the term ‘ethical’ to cover social and political justice. I contend that for 
their purposes it is necessary to distinguish carefully between (a) political conceptions of 
justice, (b) comprehensive moral doctrines, and (c) partially theorized ethical conceptions 
such as their own welfarism; it is also necessary carefully to distinguish (as they do not) 
between (d) Rawls' Law of Peoples, which is a political conception of justice providing 
principles to guide cooperation among states, and (e) the conceptions of global distributive 
justice advocated by Rawls' critics, some of whom are self-avowedly anti-statist.14
Although they aim to balance ‘the cosmopolitan view that people around the globe 
matter, not just people in one's neighborhood or nation,’ with ‘the practical realities and 
benefits of a state system,’ and although they acknowledge the existence of nations as ‘a 
basic constraint on ethical arguments,’ Posner and Weisbach (2010, pp. 6, 173) argue that 
‘climate change is a problem because it hurts people, not because it hurts countries.’ Yet 
among the many ways climate change may hurt people is that it may damage or destroy 
economic, social, cultural, and political institutions and practices. According to Rawls, 
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Al
ys
sa 
Be
rns
tei
n] 
at 
15
:47
 26
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
128  A. R. Bernstein
utilitarian (including welfarist) arguments for the international as well as domestic legal 
obligations and rights of states are inadequate (Rawls, 2001, pp. 80–134; 1999, p. 40). 
Utilitarians acknowledge this inadequacy when they endorse deontological arguments 
for such obligations,15 as do Posner and Weisbach (2010, pp. 178, 182–183) when argu-
ing against free-riding and in favor of the view that states are obligated to cooperate.16
According to Posner and Weisbach, a feasible treaty proposal is one that meets the 
International Paretianism condition. This condition states that all states must believe them-
selves better off as a result of the climate treaty, ‘by their lights’ (Posner & Weisbach, 
2010, p. 6). Many people reject welfarism or, more broadly, consequentialist or teleolog-
ical comprehensive doctrines about ethics and justice, and instead conceive their state's 
interests in terms of other secular or religious cultural values. Such people may see little 
reason to accept Posner and Weisbach's arguments or to agree to treaty proposals justifia-
ble only on welfarist grounds. However, proposals that are justifiable in terms of the public 
reasons specified by a political conception of justice can be the focus of an overlapping 
consensus and thus may meet the International Paretianism condition.
Some of the drawbacks of Posner and Weisbach's position emerge from reflection on 
the presuppositions of the climate treaty negotiations. An analysis of the idea of treaty 
obligations, sketched in the next subsections, reveals reasons why the parties to the nego-
tiations should offer each other only treaty proposals that are justifiable by public reasons, 
and why proposals not meeting this criterion are not feasible.
3.1. Treaty Obligations
If treaties create binding obligations (in the sense that a state's becoming party to a treaty 
entitles the other parties to expect that state to comply with the terms of the treaty, de-
spite self-interested reasons to do otherwise, unless it has a legitimate excuse; to object 
to non-compliance; and to employ appropriate forms and amounts of pressure to ensure 
compliance or penalize non-compliance), then treaty proposals must meet the condition 
of being appropriate contents for obligations of that kind. Treaty proposals fail to meet 
this condition if the addressee of the proposal would not agree to the proposed terms of 
cooperation (whether due to reasonably regarding them as inconsistent with the point of 
the cooperation, or inconsistent with their own fundamental interests as they understand 
them), unless pressured to do so or unless lacking relevant information or comprehension. 
Treaty proposals can meet the condition only if they do not conflict with states' fundamen-
tal interests, but instead serve their common good.
3.2. The Common Good
If states regard cooperation structured by a treaty as necessary for securing or furthering 
their own fundamental interests, then all states cooperating for this reason can share a com-
mon good, namely, the furthering of their respective fundamental interests by means of the 
treaty. Treaty proposals can serve this common good only if the addressees can accept them 
as binding, and parties to treaty negotiations cannot accept a treaty proposal as binding if it 
conflicts with the point of the cooperation, which is to serve their common good (including 
the fundamental interests of each and every state). Justifications offered in terms of public 
reasons should be acceptable to all parties willing to cooperate on fair terms.
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3.3. Public Reasons
Parties willing to cooperate on fair terms aim to avoid offering proposals that (a) can 
reasonably be rejected by the addressee due to conflict with its fundamental interests 
or with the common good, or that (b) would undermine the addressee's ability, or con-
flict with its rights, to participate in the cooperation (in this case, to participate in the 
negotiations and sign a treaty); or that (c) cannot be justified as serving the common 
good except by presupposing the truth of a comprehensive doctrine that is controver-
sial among the parties. This three-part condition can be met by proposals justifiable in 
terms of a political conception of international justice endorsable by all of the parties 
in common. Such a conception can be developed by analyzing the idea of legitimately 
governed states cooperating fairly, as does Rawls: his Law of Peoples provides a moral 
basis for the rights and obligations of states, including their obligations to secure the 
basic human rights recognized in international law. Posner and Weisbach neither offer 
nor cite any welfarist or other utilitarian conception of these rights and obligations, and 
any such conception would be problematic, for reasons corresponding to the distinctive 
theoretical and practical advantages of a political conception of climate justice, as I 
indicate below.
4. A Political Conception of Climate Justice
The political conception of climate justice here proposed endorses the principles of Rawls' 
Law of Peoples, emphasizes climate-change-relevant implications of some of them, and 
adds a principle for determining fair shares of climate-treaty-related benefits and burdens. 
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls (1999, p.37) proposes eight principles as specifying the 
fundamental rights and duties of decent political societies, which he calls ‘peoples’ (as 
distinct from ‘states,’ which refers to states that do not meet the criteria of decency).17 The 
principles of the Law of Peoples are the following:
(1)  Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to 
be respected by other peoples.
(2)  Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
(3)  Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.
(4)  Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
(5)  Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons 
other than self-defense.
(6)  Peoples are to honor human rights.
(7)  Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.
(8)  Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
These principles establish equality among peoples by ascribing the same fundamental 
rights and duties to them all. Rawls contends that the eight principles, if interpreted in 
the way he advocates, are fair to all peoples, and that they, together with his criteria for 
a decent society and his list of basic human rights, provide appropriate content for the 
foundation charter of a reasonably just system of international law.
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The Law of Peoples focuses mainly on questions concerning basic human rights in re-
lation to the moral basis, content, and limits of the rights of peoples. It provides rationales 
for the limitation of both a state's right to wage war and a state's right of internal sovereign-
ty, as found in international law since World War II. Rawls' overarching goal is a world in 
which ethnic hatreds leading to nationalistic wars will have ceased (Rawls, 1999, pp. 6–7).
Participants in fair cooperation must, logically, be agents that are both capable of co-
operating on fair terms and motivated to do so. If there can be a just international order, 
then it must be possible for states to have such a capacity and such a motivation, which 
means that it must be possible for them to be reasonable as well as rational agents. Any 
state meeting Rawls' criteria for decency (that is, any political society that is legitimately 
governed and non-expansionist, i.e., any people, as Rawls understands ‘people’) can be 
such an agent. It is possible for political societies to meet the criteria of decency; some 
present and past societies have met them. And it is plausible that, under certain realistically 
possible conditions, societies meeting these criteria would tend to act reasonably, as Rawls 
argues in the Law of Peoples (1999, pp. 25–30, 124–127).
The eight principles of the Law of Peoples are fair in the sense that decent societies 
regarding themselves and each other as free and equal, behind a veil of ignorance,18 would 
not have any reason to reject them.19 As regards freedom, if a political society is capable 
of acting for reasons, then it is free in a certain sense. If it is independent, then it is free in 
another sense: it is not obligated to obey any other political society. If it makes and follows 
its own laws and policies, then it is free in a further sense: it is self-determining. As Rawls 
conceives peoples, they are political societies that are both capable of acting for reasons 
(as understood above) and independent. His position, which I endorse, is that self-determi-
nation, duly constrained by appropriate conditions, is an important good for a people, and 
that international law should not ascribe to peoples unlimited rights of self-determination 
and independence.
Rawls assumes that all peoples have an interest in receiving from all other peoples a 
proper respect and recognition of their equality. Here, equality means equality of status as 
peoples entitled to the same rights as other peoples under international law. Rawls thinks 
that when seeking fair principles, it is appropriate to start from a baseline of equality in 
this sense. He argues that no utilitarian principle would be preferred by peoples (i.e., the 
trustees representing them) behind the veil of ignorance, since none would be prepared to 
count, as a first principle, the benefits for another people as outweighing the hardships 
imposed on itself. The trustee of each people, i.e., the party representing it in the original 
position,20 will aim to preserve their society's equality and independence; and by insisting 
on equality among peoples, these trustees rule out any form of the principle of utility. 
Whatever rights peoples are to have in relation to each other, these rights must be the 
same for them all, and must be secure: they must not be contingent in the ways that rights 
grounded in a utilitarian conception of justice would be contingent (Rawls, 1999, p. 40). I 
endorse this argument, and I agree with Rawls that justice restricts permissible means for 
promoting good consequences.
Parties to treaty negotiations are obligated to respect basic human rights. Any legiti-
mately governed society undertakes to secure at least certain basic rights for all of the indi-
vidual human beings under its government. Human rights would be secured universally if 
all states became decent political societies, i.e., peoples, and if all decent societies formed 
an association and together followed the Law of Peoples, thus constituting what Rawls 
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Al
ys
sa 
Be
rns
tei
n] 
at 
15
:47
 26
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework  131
calls a ‘Society of Peoples.’ A Society of Peoples can include peoples that are not liberal 
democracies, partly because the list of basic human rights appropriate for the foundation 
charter of a Society of Peoples does not include all of the basic rights of citizens of liberal 
democracies.21 The basic human rights can be justified either as belonging to a liberal 
political conception of justice (as a proper subset of the rights and liberties secured to all 
free and equal citizens) or as belonging to a conception of a well-ordered associationist 
society.22 They can be affirmed by all, not only by liberals or Westerners; as Rawls says, 
the basic human rights are not ‘politically parochial’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 65).23
Some of the concerns of non-Annex I countries24 (for example, that the UNFCCC be 
observed, and that the principle of CBDR be followed, and that parties to treaties be rec-
ognized as having equal standing under international law) can be expressed in terms of 
principles #1–3 of the Law of Peoples, others in terms of principles #6 and #8. From 
these principles one can draw implications regarding access to resources to fulfill basic 
human needs (including global climatic conditions necessary for the possibility of fulfill-
ment of these needs). Societies may lack the means to meet the criteria of decency; such 
‘burdened societies’ may lack material and/or technological resources, human capital and 
know-how, and/or the requisite political culture (Rawls, 1999, pp. 90, 105–113). Clearly, 
climate change may worsen conditions in some burdened societies, and may cause some 
previously decent societies to become unable to fulfill their people's human rights.25 A 
climate treaty must aim to ensure the material preconditions necessary so that all societies 
may meet the criteria of decency. Every state must, if it is able, take at least the steps such 
that not taking them would be inconsistent with being committed to this aim. Beyond this, 
states should each bear their fair share of the costs of the necessary climate change miti-
gation and adaptation measures.26
5. Practical Implications of the Political Conception of Climate Justice
If all parties to the climate treaty negotiations were to acknowledge and respect the basic 
moral constraints set by the political conception of climate justice, this would reduce their 
conflicts and make it easier for them to agree about which policy proposals would assign 
fair shares of the costs and other burdens involved in the necessary measures for reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to climate change. Below I offer some general 
guidelines for evaluating climate change treaty proposals in accordance with these basic 
moral constraints. Then I consider how the concerns of all sides to the disputes about 
CBDR (common but differentiated responsibilities) can be expressed in terms of, or in 
relation to, the political conception of climate justice, and how it can help lead to reconcil-
iation and agreement on a treaty.
State representatives should ask the following questions when evaluating treaty pro-
posals:
(1)  Would the proposal be consistent with the eight principles of the Law of Peo-
ples (or with a justified qualification of one or more of its principles)?
(2)  Would the proposal…
  (2.1) … allow progress toward a Society of Peoples, or
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  (2.2) … increase the likelihood of it or open up more ways to it?
In general, when deliberating about what the content of a treaty should be, it is nec-
essary to identify the relevant morally required and permissible goal(s) and the morally 
permissible means to them, and then to consider which of these means would be most 
effective and efficient as well as politically feasible in the current situation.27 In relation to 
climate change, one morally required goal is to prevent global average temperature from 
rising to the point of causing inundation of the territories of island nations and sea-level 
coastal nations, since no party to the negotiations whose country would be devastated 
under higher global average temperatures can agree to measures allowing this; to do so 
would conflict with the commitment to secure the human rights of the country's people, 
and also would conflict with recognition of the country's status as a party to the negotia-
tions entitled to equal rights under international law.28
If it is not possible (given the limited time available, and given the political realities),29 
to bring all of the parties to agree on the morally required goal, then there is no choice 
but to agree on a goal that comes as close as possible in the current situation to the mor-
ally required goal. Setting the less satisfactory goal (perhaps 2 degrees Centigrade) in 
the climate treaty might be necessary for securing conditions that may permit achieving 
the more satisfactory goal (perhaps 1.5 degrees Centigrade) by other means, including 
policies that can be implemented at various levels of government or by nongovernmental 
organizations, commercial corporations, and individuals. There may be various morally 
permissible means to the agreed goal that could be sufficiently effective and efficient. 
Morally permissible means would involve fair distribution of the benefits and burdens 
associated with mitigating and adapting to climate change;30 the means chosen must be as 
fair as possible in the current situation.
Legitimate concerns of negotiating parties can be articulated either in the terms pro-
vided by the political conception of climate justice or consistently with it. All negotiating 
parties should use this framework for determining appropriately justified answers to the 
questions at issue. Consider first the concerns voiced by the US representative to the UN-
FCCC.
According to US Envoy Stern,31 all countries have ‘common responsibilities in regard 
to climate change,’ but ‘what we need to do must be differentiated according to our own 
circumstances and capabilities.’ The two 1992 categories—Annex I (developed countries) 
and Non-Annex I (developing countries)—were originally distinguished on the basis of 
countries' material circumstances, which have changed in the intervening years, dramat-
ically in some cases; therefore ‘once we have made sure that the material interests … of 
developing countries are fully protected … then there is no justification’ for using the 1992 
categories. To do so in an agreement that will take effect nearly three decades after 1992 
and will govern climate diplomacy in future decades ‘would be inimical to ambition and 
would undermine the political cohesion we need to build an effective and durable climate 
system going forward.’ Stern rejects the idea that the 1992 categorization of countries was 
based on their pre-1992 historical responsibility and was intended to remain so based, 
and implicitly argues that, given constantly changing circumstances, such a basis for the 
categorization would have been neither fair nor wise.32
The Lima agreement says that the 2015 treaty should reflect ‘the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national 
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circumstances.’ This wording differs slightly from the wording in the UNFCCC. During 
the Lima negotiations, many participants argued that the developed countries must ac-
knowledge their disproportionate historical and moral responsibility for causing climate 
change as well as for persisting deep inequalities due to past colonization; and that omis-
sion of the phrase ‘differentiated responsibilities’ from the text of the agreement would 
erode the mutual trust and confidence necessary for successful cooperation in responding 
to climate change.33
My view is that justice requires powerful states to refrain from unreasonably hard bar-
gaining. It also requires that countries conceive their national interests not merely in terms 
of minimizing economic costs to themselves and increasing or preserving their own pow-
er, but also in terms of building the kinds of mutually respectful, trusting relationships 
necessary for cooperation to achieve a stably peaceful and just international order. Vol-
untary cooperation on the basis of mutually acknowledged commitment to shared goals 
and principles is required because respect for national sovereignty precludes proceeding 
otherwise. Differentiation (CBDR) should be retained, but with qualifications acknowl-
edging countries' changed material circumstances, on condition that the material interests 
of poorer countries (at least those necessary for fulfilling the basic human rights of their 
populations) be fully protected. When considering whether to preserve the 1992 catego-
rization of countries,34 the negotiators should consider what principle to guide judgment 
regarding cases of this kind35 they would endorse if they were behind a veil of ignorance 
depriving them of knowledge of which country they represent.
6. Fair Shares
The climate treaty negotiators should aim to ensure the material and other preconditions 
for the independence, self-determination, and stability of legitimately governed states, so 
that they can secure at least the basic human rights. Every state must, if it is able, take at 
least the steps such that not taking them would be inconsistent with being committed to 
the aim of ensuring the material preconditions necessary so that all societies may meet the 
criteria of decency. Beyond this, states should each bear their fair share of the costs of the 
necessary mitigation and adaptation measures.36
A number of alternative approaches to determining fair shares of climate-treaty-re-
lated benefits and burdens have been developed in the academic literature. Four of the 
most prominent approaches can be combined and revised so as to yield a principle that is 
compatible with the political conception of climate justice. Here I present this fair-shares 
principle, and in the next section I apply it to two policy proposals. Within the space con-
straints of this article I cannot fully discuss or defend this principle. My aim here is merely 
to indicate how the political conception of climate justice can be developed so as to guide 
and constrain policy deliberations.
According to the approach taken by sufficientarians, since distributive justice gives 
every person a claim to a sufficient quantity of certain goods to provide for basic needs, 
a climate treaty should impose no sacrifice on the indigent. According to the prioritar-
ian view that progressivity is a requirement of distributive justice, the less well off one 
is, the less one should be required to contribute to the production of any given good, so 
the wealthy should contribute more than the poor to the mitigation of global warming. 
There are various versions of both the sufficientarian view (to which I will refer as the 
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‘sufficiency principle’) and the prioritarian view (to which I will refer as the ‘priority 
principle’); for present purposes I will use a version of the priority principle formulated 
by Derek Parfit and a version of the sufficiency principle formulated by Robert Huseby 
(2010). Parfit distinguishes the idea that equality is to be valued and sought for its own 
sake, as intrinsically valuable, from the priority principle, which he formulates as follows: 
‘Benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are.’37 According to Huseby,
It is, in itself, bad if a person is not sufficiently well off. It is worse the farther from 
a sufficient level a person is (and especially bad if a person's basic needs are unmet), 
and worse the more people that are not sufficiently well off. (Huseby, 2010, p. 180)
Huseby favors regarding the means to subsistence or the satisfaction of basic human 
needs as a minimal sufficiency threshold (‘insufficiency below subsistence level is morally 
more urgent than insufficiency above it’), and argues for the following maximal threshold: 
‘people are sufficiently well off if their welfare level gives them a reasonable chance of 
being content’ (Huseby, 2010, p. 182). He argues that we should give absolute priority to 
those below the maximal sufficiency threshold (over those above it), and as regards those 
below this threshold, we should prioritize between them by taking into account ‘both how 
many people can be benefited, and how far from the threshold these people are;’ those be-
low the minimum threshold should be given special concern and strong priority (Huseby, 
2010, pp. 184–185).38
According to a human rights perspective developed in the academic literature, the green-
house-gas-absorptive capacity of the atmosphere is something to which each human being 
has an equal right.39 Insofar as any human rights perspective is grounded in arguments that 
are neutral between deontological and teleological justifications of human rights, it may 
avoid conflict with the Law of Peoples and the political conception of climate justice.40 
Simon Caney (2010, p. 165) presents his human-rights-centered analysis of the impacts of 
climate change as grounded in arguments that are neutral in this sense.41
According to the due care approach advocated by Richard W. Miller, climate policy-
makers should ensure fairness by employing a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Miller em-
phasizes both that all who emit greenhouse gases must undertake to mitigate the harmful 
side-effects that they jointly create, and that those who consider adopting mitigation and/
or adaptation policies must take into account the harmful side-effects, such as thwarted 
opportunities, that may result from these policies. Fair burden allocation would, he con-
tends, ‘give priority to the gravest combined burdens of climate danger and climate mit-
igation that people suffer, to grave burdens that more people suffer and to grave burdens 
that are readily relieved’ (Miller, 2010, p. 105). In order to facilitate impartial deliberation 
about particular policies, policymakers and negotiators should utilize a Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance (Miller, 2010, pp. 33, 74).42 As I interpret Miller's proposal, the policymaker's 
job would be to promote human welfare (construed in terms of human rights and their 
preconditions, as understood within the framework of the Law of Peoples) by considering, 
behind a veil of ignorance, how any proposed policies compare to each other on Miller's 
first two criteria: (1) the gravest combined burdens of climate danger and climate mitiga-
tion that people suffer, and (2) grave burdens that more people suffer. If the policies seem 
equally bad, then the choice is to be made by applying the third criterion (grave burdens 
that are readily relieved).
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Miller's proposal can be combined with a revised form of Huseby's sufficiency principle 
(which includes a limited priority principle). I will refer to this combination as the Huse-
by-Miller principle. Huseby (2010, pp. 185–186) emphasizes the compatibility between 
his principle of sufficiency and the view that people should be treated with equal respect 
and concern. He holds that the moral equality between persons justifies ‘equal rights and 
liberties, (formal) equality of opportunity, access to health care etc.,’ and that the principle 
of sufficiency requires such ‘background conditions’ (Huseby, 2010, p. 186). The Law 
of Peoples does not rely on equally strong assumptions,43 but a weaker form of Huseby's 
sufficiency principle44 would be consistent with the Law of Peoples. So would a priority 
principle limited by incorporation into the revised form of Huseby's sufficiency view.
7. Evaluation of Policy Proposals: Two Examples
Huq and Richards (2014) have proposed a global fossil fuel extraction levy to pay for loss 
and damage from climate change.45 They write that although ‘such a levy makes perfect 
legal and moral sense,’ there are ‘technical issues to be ironed out,’ and a key challenge 
is ‘how to have a globally-applied levy take into account the equity principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities at the heart of the UNFCCC.’ 
One way to do so, they suggest, is to establish a process allowing less-developed countries 
to apply for permission to opt out of contributing the levy to the international loss and 
damage mechanism so that they can instead use it for domestic mitigation or adaptation. 
This forward-looking proposal has several advantages from the perspective of the Huse-
by-Miller principle. Negotiating parties guiding their deliberative reasoning by asking the 
questions required by this principle might well opt for such a proposal, unless a better one 
were available. This comparative judgment would have to take into account the probable 
consequences of this proposed policy when implemented in the context of other policies 
in the actual circumstances.46
Paula Casal (2012, pp. 419–433) contends that an extraction-only tax would impose 
greater costs on the least fortunate than her proposed alternative, namely, global progres-
sive environmental taxation (see also Casal, 2011a, pp. 307–327, 2011b, pp. 353–365). 
She advocates ‘starting with oil use’ and then broadening the tax base by taxing either use 
or ownership of a wide range of resources, depending on the consequences (for pollution 
reduction and poverty reduction) of either type of resource taxation (Casal, 2011b, pp. 
357–358, 358; see also 2011a, pp. 320, 323, 327). Casal's proposal for global progressive 
environmental taxation has features that are attractive from the perspective of the Huse-
by-Miller principle. However, her proposal addresses two large categories of problem, 
pollution and poverty, and is not tailored to solve the narrower problem of how best (for 
purposes of agreement on a climate treaty in December 2015) to determine fair shares of 
the costs of implementing the necessary mitigation and adaptation policies. While she 
may be right that parties in a Rawlsian original position (which she construes, as does 
Thomas Pogge, as representing all of the individuals in the world, not as representing peo-
ples) would be less likely to endorse an extraction-only tax, despite the possibility of later 
compensation for the less fortunate, and would be more likely to endorse a broader tax 
base that ‘spreads the bets and lowers the risks’ (Casal, 2011b, p. 359), this argument does 
not fit comfortably into the framework of the political conception of climate justice. This 
argument also leaves open the questions of (a) whether this type of tax on global resources 
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must be included in the 2015 climate treaty, or could be implemented independently of it 
or on the basis of it (World Resources Forum, 2013), and (b) whether parties represent-
ing peoples behind a veil of ignorance would (or the actual parties to the current climate 
negotiations should) endorse such a proposal over an alternative according to which coun-
tries determine their own voluntary contributions to a Green Climate Fund to be used for 
financing the implementation of mitigation and adaptation policies worldwide.47
8. Corrective Justice and the Climate Treaty Negotiations
A conception of corrective justice must be backward-looking, unlike the political con-
ception of climate justice. US Envoy Stern advocates a forward-looking climate treaty, 
and Posner and Weisbach likewise oppose using backward-looking principles of justice 
to design a climate treaty. They emphasize the urgent importance of reaching agreement 
on a climate treaty by December of 2015; for this reason, they contend, the negotiators 
should not undertake to achieve corrective justice by means of the treaty. They doubt that 
there remains enough time to settle the controversies by arriving at answers to the difficult 
philosophical as well as legal questions about the assignment of individual and collective 
moral responsibility, as well as about appropriate penalties, that are raised by the demands 
for corrective justice.48 And they point out that it would be an ironic and momentous trag-
edy if efforts to achieve corrective justice, made on behalf of poorer and more vulnerable 
countries, derailed the climate negotiations, thus bringing about (by obstructing efforts to 
prevent) great harm to these countries.
In arguing that the climate treaty should comply with the (forward-looking) political 
conception of climate justice, I am not rejecting any requirements of corrective justice for 
which others have argued.49 The political conception of climate justice provides support 
for some claims of corrective justice. Moreover, fulfillment of the requirements of the for-
mer would in effect fulfill requirements of the latter to a significant extent. By endorsing 
the political conception of climate justice, states would acknowledge (at least implicitly) 
that much international conduct has been gravely unjust, egregiously violating the princi-
ples of the Law of Peoples. Fulfillment of the duty of assistance specified in the Law of 
Peoples would greatly improve conditions in countries that have been subjected to unjust 
invasions or colonialist or imperialist exploitation.
While I agree with Posner and Weisbach about the urgent importance of achieving a cli-
mate agreement by December, I contend that the primary objective must be to achieve, as 
soon as possible, a climate treaty that satisfies the requirements of the political conception 
of climate justice to the extent possible within the relevant time-frame. To achieve such 
a treaty would be to secure essential preconditions for a just global Society of Peoples, 
as well as preconditions for achievement of the goals of sufficientarian, prioritarian and 
egalitarian advocates of distributive justice (in the narrow sense of this term).
9. Distributive Justice
Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 76) provide only a vague and ambiguous description of a 
Rawlsian conception of distributive justice, which they criticize.50 The description applies 
equally well to the positions taken by some of Rawls' critics, in particular, Charles Beitz 
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and Thomas Pogge. For this reason the criticisms that Posner and Weisbach direct toward 
Rawls fail to apply to his own view.
Nowhere in their book do Posner and Weisbach cite either Rawls' 1993 article on the 
Law of Peoples or his 1999 book.51 Moreover, they use the term ‘distributive justice’ to 
refer only to equalization of material conditions, whether done for the sake of increasing 
aggregate welfare or for other reasons.52 This is the way the term is used by some of Rawls' 
most prominent critics. To think that this is the only meaning of ‘distributive justice’ is to 
overlook the difference between the broader and narrower senses of the term that Rawls 
distinguishes (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42, 122). In the narrower sense, only questions of distribu-
tion of wealth and income53 are questions of distributive justice (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42, 122). 
In the broader sense, both (a) the question of which principles should guide creation and 
reform of the basic institutions (legal and political as well as economic) of a single society, 
and (b) the question of which principles should guide creation and reform of international 
laws and institutions, are questions of distributive justice. If one thinks that all questions 
of justice that concern laws and political, social, and economic institutions must be either 
questions of distributive justice in the narrow sense or else questions of corrective justice 
(concerning rectification of past wrongs or crimes), then one is missing a large category 
of important questions about justice. These include many questions about the rule of law 
and basic rights that are among the fundamental questions of distributive justice addressed 
in the Law of Peoples.
10. Conclusion
Above I have argued that Posner and Weisbach's welfarist approach to climate treaty ne-
gotiation has theoretical, moral, and practical drawbacks, while the political conception 
of climate justice has corresponding advantages and is an appropriate framework for the 
climate treaty negotiations.54 Since this conception of climate justice is based on the Law 
of Peoples, which is a political conception of international justice and human rights that 
can be the focus of an overlapping consensus, and since the proposed fair-shares principle 
is consistent with the Law of Peoples and endorsable by proponents of several of the main 
approaches to determining fair shares, there is reason to think that the political conception 
of climate justice can, like the Law of Peoples, serve as a basis for international coopera-
tion freely undertaken, willingly continued, and long-enduring despite the great cultural 
and political differences between countries.
This is not true of the welfarist approach advocated by Posner and Weisbach. They 
declare that for their purposes they can ‘bracket the largest debates’ between deontolog-
ical conceptions of justice and other conceptions such as their own welfarism, and that 
their position is ‘broadly compatible with most deontological claims’ (Posner & Weisbach, 
2010, p. 172). However, in giving short shrift to deontological conceptions of justice and 
offering little discussion or defense of welfarism (their own definition of which is brief 
and vague),55 Posner and Weisbach neglect to distinguish between the Law of Peoples and 
the positions taken by its critics, cannot see the great value of Rawls' political conception 
of international justice, and do not notice that the arrows of criticism they themselves aim 
at the Law of Peoples do not reach their intended target. Therefore they fail to consider 
the need for a political conception of climate justice on which there can be an overlapping 
consensus.
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Today the United States and most, if not all, other states acknowledge constraints of 
justice applying to international relations, even though they disagree about what distrib-
utive justice may require as regards redistribution of wealth. These states must, on pain 
of logical inconsistency, acknowledge the implications of the principles of international 
justice that they already (purportedly) endorse; otherwise they would not actually endorse 
them. These implications include:
•  Commitment to international peace and the rule of international law.
•  Commitment to refrain from acting in ways that would render impossible, or 
would obstruct, the development of a peaceful global order of legitimate states 
freely cooperating in accord with international law.
•  Commitment to contribute to efforts to prevent states from losing the material pre-
conditions for fulfilling the basic human rights of their populations and sustaining 
legitimate political institutions.
These implications set a condition for an acceptable climate treaty: it must be possible 
for negotiators to propose it to each other, and to accept it freely, consistently with the 
above commitments. A treaty negotiated within the framework of the political conception 
of climate justice would meet this condition, but a welfarist treaty of the kind advocated 
by Posner and Weisbach would not.
Humanity can no longer take for granted that the natural ecological and climate systems 
on which our lives depend will continue to function as they did throughout history prior to 
the era of industrial economies reliant on fossil fuels (indeed, these systems have already 
changed dramatically, as is widely known although not universally admitted). The crisis 
of climate change is clear, and we need a moral framework for dealing with it: one that 
can help us to find common ground, build mutual trust and confidence, create enduring 
structures for cooperation, and make progress toward the goal of a stably peaceful and just 
international order that facilitates sustainable development.56 The political conception of 
climate justice offered above is such a framework.
Acknowledgements
I delivered a precursor of this article (‘Climate Change and Global Justice: A Critique of V. Zanetti, E. Posner, 
and D. Weisbach’) at the Georgia State University conference, Global Justice and International Law, September 
2012. I thank Andrew Altman, Jean-Cassien Billet, Ruediger Bittner, Gillian Brock, Martin Carrier, Francis 
Cheneval, Candice Delmas, Frank Dietrich, Christie Hartley, Kristen Hessler, Maria Kronfeldner, Lukas Meyer, 
Richard W. Miller, Thomas Pogge, George Rainbolt, Anna Stilz, Kok-Chor Tan, Adam Toon, and Veronique 
Zanetti for comments or discussions of topics relating to that paper. For especially valuable written comments 
on this article, I thank Jeppe von Platz and Allen W. Wood (both of whom commented on more than one draft), 
and for helpful written comments on a draft I thank also Austin Babrow, Samuel Freeman Alfred Lent, Elijah 
Millgram, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal. I am grateful to Stela Goldenstein, former Secretary 
of the Environment of São Paulo, Brazil, for correspondence regarding the position taken by U.S. Envoy Stern. 
For all of their work as the guest editors of this special journal issue, I thank Idil Boran and Kenneth Shockley. I 
am especially grateful to my husband, Todd Shannon Bastin, for helping me think through my arguments for this 
paper and helping enable me to write it (sine quo non).
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Al
ys
sa 
Be
rns
tei
n] 
at 
15
:47
 26
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework  139
Disclosure statement
No potential con!ict of interest was reported by the author.
 1
 An ‘optimal’ climate treaty ‘reduces emissions to the extent that the cost of reducing emissions a little 
bit more is equal to the benefit of reducing emissions a little bit more; in economic terms, the marginal 
costs equal the marginal benefits,’ taking into consideration the lowest cost emissions reductions wher-
ever they may be worldwide and counting ‘all of the harms from climate change’ (Posner & Weisbach, 
2010, p. 56).
 2
 More recently Posner and Weisbach have reaffirmed their central contention. They argue that a feasible 
climate treaty would be ‘designed so that all states consider themselves better off than in the status quo,’ 
and that achieving such a treaty in the near future requires focusing on how to ‘reduce carbon emissions 
at an acceptable cost,’ since ‘[e]ven if Americans were to take seriously the ethical arguments of phi-
losophers, it seems unlikely that many of them would be persuaded that a climate treaty should impose 
disproportionate burdens on the US, and likewise for people in other rich countries’ (Posner & Weisbach, 
2013, pp. 355, 358).
 3
 Posner and Weisbach's welfarism is a conception of the fundamental ethical considerations that should 
guide policymaking, according to which policymakers should aim to maximize welfare or well-being: 
‘Welfarists seek policies that maximize people's well-being, defined variously as their subjective sense 
of well-being, satisfaction of desires or preferences, or satisfaction of certain objective parameters’ (Pos-
ner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 171). Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 8) neither specify a particular interpre-
tation of welfare nor exclude non-humans: ‘The welfarist approach approves of acts that increase the 
welfare of relevant people (and possibly animals)’. Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 217, n. 7) say that 
utilitarianism is a form of welfarism; however, as these terms are normally used, welfarism is a form of 
utilitarianism.
 4
 While agreeing with Posner and Weisbach about the need for a climate treaty, I agree also with Dale 
Jamieson: ‘Most action on climate change will take place within regions, within countries, within com-
munities, and in the hearts and minds of individuals’ (Gutting & Jamieson, 2015).
 5
 John Broome (see Broome, 2012), too, takes a welfarist approach to questions of justice and ethics in 
relation to climate change. However, his particular arguments differ from those offered by Posner and 
Weisbach.
 6
 In this article I focus on the topic of distributive justice, but later I briefly return to the topic of corrective 
justice.
 7
 Much of the academic work on global justice published in the last several decades has engaged with the 
central ideas of John Rawls' conceptions of domestic and international justice.
 8
 My interpretation of Rousseau is informed by the work of Joshua Cohen (see Cohen, 2010) as well as 
the work of John Rawls (see Rawls, 2007b). My interpretation of Kant's political philosophy is presented 
in Bernstein, 2008a, 2009, 2013, 2014.
 9
 Although in this article I will refer to this conception as ‘the political conception of climate justice,’ I do 
so only for convenience (instead of using the longer phrase, ‘a political conception of justice appropriate 
to serve as a moral framework for the climate treaty negotiations’). I claim neither that it is the sole pos-
sible formulation of a reasonable political conception of climate justice nor that all questions of climate 
justice can be adequately addressed by it.
10
 This and all quotations of Stern are from Stern, 2014.
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Al
ys
sa 
Be
rns
tei
n] 
at 
15
:47
 26
 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
140  A. R. Bernstein
11
 ‘According to corrective justice, if one person harms another person, the first person should provide a 
remedy, such as cash, to the victim’ (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 100).
12
 According to Posner and Weisbach (2010, pp. 96–98), distributive justice requires reducing poverty and 
giving priority to the poorest and most desperately needy.
13
 For discussion of the idea of an overlapping consensus, see Rawls (1993/1996/2005, pp. 133–172; 1999, 
pp. 32, 172–174; 2001, pp. 32–38).
14
 Among the most prominent critics of Rawls' Law of Peoples are Charles Beitz, Martha Nussbaum, 
Onora O'Neill, and Thomas Pogge. For an explanations and rebuttals of their criticisms, see Bernstein# 
2007a2012c2012d2012e2012f2012g2012h.
15
 Compare Rawls' analysis of the political philosophy of John Stuart Mill: see Rawls, 2007a, pp. 307–308, 
313.
16
 In economics, free riders either consume more than their fair share of a common resource, or pay less 
than their fair share of the cost of a common resource; in relation to public goods more generally, free 
riders benefit without doing their fair share to generate or maintain the good.
17
 Rawls discusses the idea of a people in Rawls, 1999, pp. 4, 17, 25–27, 34–37, 44–45, 111–113.
18
 Rawls discusses the idea of the veil of ignorance in Rawls, 1999, pp. 30–33, 43, as well as in Rawls, 
1993/1996/2005, pp. 24–27
19
 I explain the argument justifying the eight principles in Bernstein, 2012g.
20
 Rawls explains the idea of the original position with its veil of ignorance in Rawls, 1999, pp. 10, 17, 
26, 30–33, 39–42, 63, 68–70, 82–83, 115, 140, as well as in Rawls, 1993/1996/2005, pp. 304–310. The 
original position is a theoretical device used in a type of thought experiment for testing the fairness of 
principles for organizing political and economic cooperation. Different versions of the original position 
(and of the veil of ignorance) are appropriate for answering different moral and political questions. In 
the Law of Peoples Rawls uses a version of the original position in order to test proposed principles of 
international justice. He characterizes it by various stipulations. For example, each of the parties in the 
original position is responsible for the fundamental interests of a decent society (either liberal or not), 
and they are behind a veil of ignorance that deprives the parties of knowledge of any particulars about 
their society, such as the size of its territory, its level of economic development, its natural resources, its 
population, or how powerful it is as compared to other societies. The principles that would be chosen 
unanimously by these parties behind the veil of ignorance would serve the fundamental interests of every 
people and would secure basic human rights globally if all peoples were to establish a Society of Peoples 
based on these principles.
21
 See Bernstein, 2006, 2007b.
22
 An associationist form of society ‘sees persons first as members of groups—associations, corporations, 
and estates’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 68).
23
 Moreover, they ‘do not depend on any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical 
doctrine of human nature’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 68).
24
 Regarding the categorization of countries, the UNFCCC implements the concept of CBDR by creating 
several classes of parties through the annexes. Annex I includes the wealthier OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) States, as well as the former Eastern Bloc States ‘undergoing 
the process of transition to a market economy.’ Annex II includes only the OECD States. ‘By omis-
sion, therefore, all remaining parties are developing countries. At several junctures … the UNFCCC 
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makes further special provisions for “least developed countries” and “small island States”’ (Guruswamy, 
1997/2012, p. 225).
25
 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014.
26
 Again, what states' representatives in the climate treaty negotiations can reasonably and plausibly com-
mit their state to do may depend on their state population's political will and on realistic expectations 
about the likelihood of reshaping it to a sufficient extent within the time available.
27
 To change current conditions so as to approach more closely the ideal of the Society of Peoples would 
require not only that burdened societies be assisted (and perhaps also compensated), but also that other 
states failing to meet the criteria of decency (e.g., those with oppressive governments) be reformed. 
Significant changes such as these are not likely to happen in time for the climate treaty meeting sched-
uled for December of 2015. The most that could be done is to take certain initial necessary steps toward 
making such changes. Does the climate treaty negotiation provide a uniquely valuable opportunity for 
some countries to ensure that such steps get taken by other countries? If some countries believe that it 
does, then they may refuse to agree to a climate treaty unless other countries take such steps; but if the 
other countries refuse to take such steps, then it may be impossible to reach agreement on a climate 
treaty. In order to avoid this outcome, the negotiators should interpret and use the above questions with 
these contingencies in mind.
28
 On this topic, Sovacool et al. misinterpret Rawls. See their remarks about Tuvalu in Sovacool, Sidortsov, 
and Jones, 2014, p. 34.
29
 Suppose a country's representative claims that it is significantly unlikely that her country's population 
or legislature would accept a climate treaty incorporating a requirement of justice grounded in the Law 
of Peoples, and there is sufficient evidence supporting this claim. In this case it would be necessary to 
aim for an agreement that would approach fulfillment of the relevant requirement of justice as closely 
as possible (given the current contingent constraints) and would leave open, or would open up, a way to 
fulfill that requirement of justice more completely in the future.
30
 Below I discuss fair shares of costs and other burdens.
31
 As above, all quotations of Stern are from Stern, 2014.
32
 ‘China is not just the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, it is the second largest historic emitter. Nearly 
every decade, the world emits more than all the CO2 we emitted before 1970. A number of non-Annex 1 
countries are at this point among the world's wealthiest. Dozens have higher per capita income than the 
low end of Annex 1 countries’ (Stern, 2014).
33
 See, e.g., Priest, 2014, and Embajada de Brasil, 2014.
34
 A reason to doubt that the 1992 categorization of countries was based on their pre-1992 historical 
responsibility, and was intended to remain so based, is provided by the summary of the UNFCCC's 
remedial objectives offered in Guruswamy, 1997/2012, p. 222: ‘[The third remedial objective is that] 
climate change policies and laws should be based on equity and in accordance with the principle of 
CBDR [art. 3(1)]. This principle recognizes that only international cooperation will help to resolve a 
problem of the magnitude of climate change, but that in responding to the problem different states have 
different social and economic conditions that affect their response capabilities. CBDR also incorporates 
the equitable notion that industrialized countries, which have [notice the tense of this verb] the largest 
share of historical emissions of GHGs, should take the first actions to ameliorate the problem. It deserves 
emphasis, however, that in the UNFCCC developing countries accepted their “common” responsibility 
for addressing climate change. The UNFCCC refers to the CBDR of all States, and does not define such 
responsibilities as the sole and exclusive obligation of industrialized countries.’
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35
 The question is whether treaty negotiators who have the authority to change a previously agreed legal 
categorization should preserve it, despite relevant circumstances having changed so as to render the 
previous categorization unwise in terms of efficiency.
36
 What states' representatives can reasonably and plausibly commit their state to do may depend on their 
state population's political will and on realistic expectations about the likelihood of reshaping it to a 
sufficient extent within the time available.
37
 Huseby is my source for Parfit's version of the priority principle: Huseby, 2010, p. 185, quoting from p. 
213 of Parfit, 1997. Regarding sufficiency, Huseby (2010, p. 179) explains that it is ‘a telic principle (i.e., 
one directed toward an end or ideal) according to which we can evaluate outcomes based on a limited 
amount of information concerning especially the number of individuals and their welfare levels.’ He for-
mulates the principle as he does in order to evade an objection (raised by Paula Casal): that defenders of 
the sufficiency principle hold that principles of equality and priority have no place in distributive ethics 
(Huseby, 2010, p. 180, n. 6). Casal distinguishes between a positive thesis, according to which ‘it is im-
portant that everyone has enough,’ and a negative thesis, which ‘denies that either equality or priority has 
any role to play “at least above some critical threshold”’ (Huseby, 2010, p. 179, quoting Casal, 2007, pp. 
298–299). The version of the principle of sufficiency defended by Huseby implies the negative thesis.
38
 Huseby (2010, p. 185) emphasizes that these priority rules apply only ‘between the sufficiency lines’ and 
that ‘what counts is not the value of benefits, but the disvalue of shortfalls.’
39
 Some writers argue on the basis of human rights for equal per capita shares of the capacity of the at-
mospheric sink. This group includes: Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Jamieson, 2001; Meyer, 2000; Singer, 
2002. Henry Shue (1999/2010, p. 108), for example, argues that everyone should have ‘enough for a 
decent chance for a reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal length,’ and that it is ‘unfair 
not to guarantee everyone at least an adequate minimum’ when circumstances are such that ‘some people 
have less than enough for a decent human life, other people have far more than enough, and the total 
resources available are so great that everyone could have at least enough without preventing some people 
from still retaining considerably more than others have.’ Shue's position can plausibly be construed as 
implying a human right to emit greenhouse gases up to the level of subsistence: Toft & Hargrove, 2013, 
p. 221. This position is open to the criticism that while there is a right to secure access to the means to a 
decent life, fulfilling the latter right does not necessarily require greenhouse gas emissions, since econ-
omies can be based on renewable resources instead of fossil fuels: Hayward, 2009, pp. 432–433. The 
UN does not (to my knowledge) recognize climate-specific human rights, but its Human Rights Council 
emphasizes that climate change impacts basic rights such as the rights to life, to adequate food, to water, 
to health, and to adequate housing; it also impacts the self-determination of some peoples, including 
those living in low-lying island states: Human Rights Council, 2009, pp. 8–13, 20, 24.
40
 A conception of human rights grounded in a comprehensive moral doctrine (whether religious or secu-
lar) would conflict with the Law of Peoples if it justified a different list of human rights. However, if the 
lists overlap, then these rights simply have two justifications, and the rights on both lists can be justified 
in Rawlsian terms to people who do not endorse the comprehensive doctrine.
41
 Insofar as the human rights on which Caney bases his policy evaluations (rights to life, health, and 
subsistence) are included in Rawls' list, his approach may be compatible with the Law of Peoples and 
with the political conception of climate justice. Caney's (2010, pp. 166–169) formulations of the human 
rights to life, health, and subsistence appear to be fully compatible with the Law of Peoples, although 
his conception of global distributive justice conflicts with Rawls': see Caney, 2005b, and Bernstein, 
2012a–2012b.
42
 At least two different stages of decision-making would be necessary because applying the third criterion 
(grave burdens that are readily relieved) would require full knowledge about the relevant empirical facts 
and particulars, including knowledge of the context of other policies in which this particular policy 
would get enacted. If the first stage of decision-making must take place behind a veil of ignorance, then 
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the veil must be lifted to some extent for the second stage. Compare what Rawls says about his two 
principles for a just democratic society: ‘The principles of justice are adopted and applied in a four-stage 
sequence’ (Rawls, 2001, p. 48; see also pp. 112–114, 172–174).
43
 The Law of Peoples does not presuppose that people can be content only in liberal societies of one kind 
or another, nor that people living in decent non-liberal societies cannot be content.
44
 This would be a sufficiency principle like Huseby's, but omitting his strong assumption about the condi-
tions (probably) necessary for contentment and instead including a weaker assumption to the effect that 
living in a decent society is necessary for contentment.
45
 This is one of various proposals for taxing natural resources. Another proposal, which has been widely 
discussed, is the Global Resources Dividend proposed by Thomas Pogge (2002, pp. 202–221).
46
 For this reason it seems that following Miller's suggestion for using a veil of ignorance would require 
raising the veil either once (fully, i.e., making all information available) or else more than once (by 
degrees). Raising the veil by degrees seems necessary.
47
 In 2011 the Green Climate Fund was designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of 
the UNFCCC, in accordance with Article 11 of the Convention. ‘The fund will pursue a country-driven 
approach and promote and strengthen engagement at the country level through effective involvement of 
relevant institutions and stakeholders’ (Green Climate Fund, 2015). ‘While the Governing Instrument of 
the GCF states that developed countries will provide the bulk of GCF financial inputs, the Board decid-
ed to allow for flexibility in resourcing. Initially, it will only accept grants from the public and private 
sector, paid-in public capital contributions and concessional public loans. Over time, it may attract other 
forms of finance from the private or philanthropic sector, including from institutional investors, as well 
as from alternative sources (for example new taxes or levies from which funding might be raised for the 
GCF)’ (Overseas Development Institute, 2014, p. 4).
48
 For discussions of philosophical issues relevant to corrective justice, see, e.g.: Caney, 2005a, pp. 747–
775; Gardiner, 2011, pp. 399–437; Garvey, 2008, pp. 66–80; Meyer, 2013, pp. 597–614; Miller, 2010, 
pp. 95–96; Moellendorf, 2009, pp. 106–131.
49
 Neither am I here endorsing any specific demands for corrective justice applied to the climate treaty.
50
 Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 76) write: ‘perhaps the obligations of nations should be determined by 
invoking John Rawls' idea of a “veil of ignorance”: What principles of justice would reasonable people 
select if they were deprived of information about their own circumstances, including the nation in which 
they find themselves? Very plausibly, people would choose principles that would require those in rich 
countries to give a great deal to those in poor countries, especially if the latter are at serious risk.’ The 
endnote attached to the last quoted sentence, n. 6 on p. 208, does not cite Rawls, but instead Martha 
Nussbaum and Steve Vanderheiden. Nussbaum is well known as a critic of the Law of Peoples.
51
 In support of their description of Rawls' view they cite only writings by two other authors, only one of 
whom (Nussbaum) has published much about Rawls. When citing Rawls directly (which they do only 
once, if I'm not mistaken), they refer only to an article he published in 1964, three decades before his 
publications on the Law of Peoples.
52
 Benjamin Sachs' criticism of their use of this term is partly distinct from, but compatible with, the criti-
cism I offer here: see Sachs, 2014, p. 215.
53
 In Rawls' conception of a just liberal democratic society, justice as fairness, such questions are governed 
by the difference principle, which is part of the second of his two principles of domestic social justice: 
see Rawls, 2001, p. 43.
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54
 Robert Huseby argues that climate justice can be adequately addressed from the perspective of Rawls' 
theory of international justice, if it is further developed. He proposes adding a ninth principle to the Law 
of Peoples: ‘Peoples recognize that adverse effects of climate change may undermine or threaten to 
undermine the prospects of most (if not all) peoples and societies to establish and/or maintain internally 
just or decent well-ordered institutions. This will, by implication, undermine or threaten to undermine 
the role of The Law of Peoples in regulating and expanding a peaceful and stable Society of Peoples. 
Therefore, just and decent peoples have an interest in undertaking, and a duty to undertake, the measures 
necessary to prevent such adverse effects from materializing, and to alleviate them when and where they 
do materialize’ (Huseby, 2013, p. 234). Huseby contends that this amendment ‘would only be a first, 
but crucial, step toward developing more specific schemes for distributing the burdens following from 
climate change’ (Huseby, 2013, p. 242).
55
 As Nussbaum (2013, p. 471) points out, ‘[Posner and Weisbach] do not define deontology, and they offer 
only a glancing definition of welfarism.’
56
 ‘Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Devel-
opment, 1987, p. 43).
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